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fL. A. No. 19336. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1945.]

DOROTHY K. CUI"LEY, nespondent, T. NEW YORK LIFE
INSURANCE ('O~rp.ANY (a Corporation), Appellant.
(1] Insurance - .PI ..miums - Forfeiture for Nonpayment.-A disability policy provision, that premiums are waived if due
after receipt of proof of total disability, bas no application
to a premium rayable b~fore receipt of proof of total disability, and nonpll~'m~nt thpTeof Te!'ult!' in the lnp~ing of the
policy.
(2) Id.-Actions-Evidellce-DiaabilitJ.-lu all actioll to recover
disobility bendits und~r a policy, the evidence lupported a
finding that the insured was totally and presumably permanentl~ disahled prior to the date of default in payment of
premiums where be had for 80mI' time previously been suffering froDl cancer and was compelled to forego his usual business
activities as real estate broker and appraiser.
(3) Id. - Extent of Lo8S - Accident or Health lusurance - Total
Diaabillt;v.-"Total disability," within a policy providing for

)

(3) When insured. deemed to be totally diaabled, aote8, 24
A.L.R. 203; 79 A.L.R. 857; 98 AL.R. 780.
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1] Insur&Dce, § 92; [2] lnsur&Doe, 1293;
[3] Insurance, 1195; [4] In8urance, 1295; (6) Insurance, ,27 •
[6-8] Insurance, 1203; [9] Insurance, 160; [10] Insurnn~.
1203(3); [lll Inaurance, 1241. (12) Abatement, 141; (13) la.vance, I 219.
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payment of disability benefit" on receipt of' th(, requisitl'
proof, is a disability that prevents the insured from working
with reasonable continuity in his customary occupatioll or in
any other occupation with which he might reasonably be expected to engag-e in vil'w of hi~ o;tAtion and physical and
mental capacity.
(4a-4c] Id.-Actions--Evidence-Proof of Lass.-in au action to
recover disabiI'ity benefits, the evidenee justified a finding that
due proof of the insured's disability was. furnished on the last
day of the period pres~ribed in the policy, although the claim
form filled out in the presence of the insurer's representative
was not filed with the insurer until the following day, where
the insurer did not explain why it did not keep a promise
to make the forms available on an earlier date, and where it
sent its representative on the last day to enah)1' the insl11'er
to make proof of disability.
[6] Id.-Agent8-Imputation to Principal of Agont's Knowledge.
-The knowledge acquired by the insurer's inspector in the
course of hi", im·I'~t.i'!ntion of n !'Inint i~ thl' knowledgoe of his
principal
[6] ld.-Proof of Loss-Diaability.-The term "due pl'Oof" of disability, in the absence of a specific requirement in the policy,
does not require any partieular form of proof which the insured might arbitrarily demand, but only such a statement of
fact as would require payment of the claim.
[7] ld.-Proof of Loss-Disabilit7.-Due proof of disability is required to enable the insurer to form an estimate of its rights
and liabilities, and what the reasonable requirements for that
purpose are depends on circumstances of the particular case.
[S] ld.-Proof of Loss-Disability.-Where a policy providing for
the payment of disability benefits on receipt of proof of total
disability contains no express requirement that proof be given
in writing, such a requirement may not be implied from other
provisions of the policy requiring receipt at the insurer's home
office of income payments and waiver of premiums, since such
provision is not concerned with how proof is to be given, but
with when benefits are to begin,
[9] 1d.-Oonuacts-lDterpretation-Aga.inst Inaurer.-Any doubt
as to the meaning of a policy must be resolved in favor of the
insured.
[10] Id.-Proof of Loss-Conclusiveness.-In the absence of estoppel, statements of proofs of 1088 are Dot conclusive but
are subject to explanation and correction.
[6] Form and contents of proof that will satisfy req11ireDlent of
"dlle proof of c1iaabilitJ," JUlte, 109 A..L.B. 825.
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[11] Id.-Actions-Conditions Precedent.-An unconditional denial of liability by an insurer after the insured has marl(' claim
of disability under the policy gives rise to an imlllPrji:ltr ('am('
of action, Rnd no tendpT of premiums is necessary.
f121 Abatement--Death of Party-Contract.- Whcn- a <,ause or
action for disability bell<'fits aTose whilr the insurerl was ali\'('.
it. is immutrrini th'nt thE' complaint wns filpn after his dpafh.
[13] Insurance - Proceeds. - Under a d11;.nbility poliey providiJl~
for pnyment of such benefits on receipt of proof of total disabilit~·, there can be no recovery for bell!'fits for any period
preceding the time of receipt of such proof or the waiver
thereof by denial of liability after the insured had made claim
of disahility.

APPEAl. from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John Beardsley, Judge. Modified and
affirmed.
Action on an insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff modified and affirmed.
Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and Hewlings Mumper for
Appellant.
C. H. Hartke for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action to recover thr
face value and disability benefits of a life insurance poliC':-issued in 1923 by defendant on the life of plaintiff's husbullcl,
who died on April 14, 1941, of cancer of the chest. The insured defaulted in the payment of the quarterly premium of
$70 due on August 20, 1940, and failed to pay the premium
during the one-month period of grace allowed in the policy.
On September 22, 1940, defendant agreed to give the insUTNl
until October 20th to make good the default. The insured
paid defendant $20 in cash, which gave him term insurance
at the rate of $2.00 per thousand for one month, and signed
a S()-called blue note for $50, plus interest, payable on October
20th. All rights under. the policy were to be restored upon
payment of the note, whereas failure to pay would make the
default in the payment of the premium final as of August
20th. (Eddie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Cal.App. 199
1242 P. 5011; Talsky v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 App.Div.
661 [280 N.Y.S. 69].) The insured failed to pay the note
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when it fell uue, and on Octohcr 20. I!) to. clef('lI(bnl notified
him thnthis policy had lapsed.
Plaintiff relics on sec·tioll ] (4) of the policy, whicll provides: "Ill the event of default in pllymellt of' prellliulll art('r
the Insured IlHs berOllic totally disahled, thc poli('~' will 1)('
restored upon payment of aJ'J'clil'S of premiulIl with interest
at 5%, provided due proof that the Insured is tot.ally and
presumably permanentl~' oisahled, as herein dcfined, is received by the Compan~' not later than six months after said
default and the benefits unoer this section shnll then he the
"lame as if said default had not oc('urre(1. ,. 'I'llI' t.ria 1 ('onrt
fonnd that the insured was totally and presumnbl~' perma"elltly disabled before .Au~ust 20th: that oefendant received
,Inc proof of such oi::;nhilitv Oll Fehruary 20. 1941: and that
:,·fl'lIrlant denied liabiJit~· 'under the poiiC'~-on Fehr1H1r~' 18,
:!) 11. and thereh~' \\1ah'rd any fllrther preminms. 'I'llI' court
.' b·o found that 110 premium was 01H' and payable 011 A 11 gust
.!(). 1940. on the grouno that the in::;ureo was then disabled
within the mcanin~ of t.he poJiC'y. 'I'he court gave judrrment
;'.)], the plaintiff in the sum of $10,G32.46, which included dis:thility b(>m'fit~ for a fH>rioo of nin(> months nC'ff'ndant appenIs.
[1] 'I'he tilldillu that no premiulll was Jue and pa~'able
on August 20. 1940. cannot be sustained. Premiums are
waived under the policy only if due after receipt of proof
of total disabilit~,. Since no proof was received until Fehruary. 1941. defendant's contention that the policy laps('d
for nonpa~'ment of tl1(' AU!rost premium must be upheld.
The question remains. however, whether the policy was restored under the provisions of section 1 (4-) thereof.
[2] nefendant contend!" that the trial court's finding that.
the insured was totaIJ~- and presumably permanently disabled before AU!rost 2n. 1940. is not supported b~' the e\'idence. 'I'he evidence shows without ('onfiiet that for sOllie
time before 1940 the ins11J'(,o had cancer; that at lea~t since
the beginning of July. 1940. he suffered severe pain and lost
weight and strength rapidly: and that he was compelled to
forgo his usual btl!~iness aeth'ilies ItS real estate broker and
appraiser. He came to his offi!'e re~nlarly and stayed only
for short periods. a\'oiding customers. He performed no work
after .Tul" of 1940 for which he or his firm received any remunerati~n. The policy provides that "Disability shall be
deemed to be total whenever the Insured is whol1y disabled
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by h()(]il.l· injury or disellse so tlJ:lt he is prevented thereby
fr()!lJ ('JI~;;I~jng ill ,my oecupation whatsoc\'er for remulleratioJl
or pl'l)fit." [3] It is settled in this statr that total disabil·
i1.'· \\'i1hin thr meaning .of this provision is a disahility that
I 'I'l'\'l'nt~ t lw msur(>(J from H\yorkilE! with reasonn bl(' cont illui1.1 ill his Cl1s1oll1nr.l OCC111'<ll inn or jll any other oecupatioll in which he might r(>[Iso)whly he ('xpeple(] to ellgage
ill vic\\' of' his station nnrl pllysical ana mental capacity."
(En'ecci v. TI'csfrnl Slfllcg Ufr lns. Co., 1!l Ca1.2rl 3R8, 394,
305 [121 P.2cl (is!). 141A.L.n. 1)81: H1I1-lI'it v. Prudential Ins.
ro. of .·lmenca. Vi ral.App.2d 74. 81 1113 P.2d 6D11.) A
finding that the insurNl is tota ]].1' disabled is not preclllded
b:v th(' fact that he still g'O(,S to his officr irregnlarly and engages sporadically in Imsinrss matters. "According to overwhelming authority. the term 'totnl disability' does not signif.l' an absolute state of helplessn('s" but mrans snch a disability a~ render~ th(> insnrro nnllblp to perform the substantial and mntNinl acts necessary to the prosecution of a business or occupation in th(' nsnal or customary way, Recovery
is not precluded under a total disahility proyision because
the insured is a ble to perform sporadic tasks, or give attention to simple or incollseCjuential detail!,; incident to the conduct of business." f19 Cll1.2d 388. 396.) The finding of
the trial court must therefore be upheld. for the evidence
clearly shows that the conoition of the insured before August
20, ] 940, prevented him from performing the duties of his
occupation or an.l· other occnpation in which he might reasonabl~' have been expected to engage.
[4a] Defendant also contend1> that it did not receiye due
proof of the insured's disability within six months after his
default in the pa~'-mel1t of the premium. On February 15,
] 941. a representath-e of the insured called at defendant's
Los Angeles office. Hr showed the policy to two of defendant's employees, 011(' of them defendant's supervisor of agencies, and told them that the insureil was critically ill in the
hospital with cancer' that he intencled to rely on the restoration clause in the polic~-: thllt sinre the premium was in default since Aug-nst 20th. the six months' period would expire
on the 20th of February: Imd that it was therefore necessary
to have immediately the form~ on which to claim disability
benefits. This conyersation occurreo on Saturday. February
15, 1941. Both employees replied that they had no fonus at
that time bnt that th(' forms would be mailed to the office

')
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of' the insured "and would he there the first thing Monday
morning, February 17th." The forms were not mailed as
promised, hut on the afternoon of F'ehl'uary 20th an inspector
sent by defendant to investignte the claim called at the office
of the insured. He brought n form for proof of disability,
whieh was filler1 out in his presence, and was signed at t.he
hospital by plaintiff' on behalf of her hushand.The inspector
inquired of. thp businrss partner of the insured with regard
to the circumstances of th(' insured's rlisa hility '!md was told
"substantiaily thp facts with' referencr to Mr. Culle~·."· to
which the partner testified at the trial. This testimony described in detail the decline in the insured's health throughout 1940. [5] The inspector was sent b~' defendant t.o investigate the claim, and the knowledge that he acquired in
the course of his investig-ation is th(' knowledge of his principal. (Vanciel v. K1lmle. 26 r.lll.2rl7::J2. 7::J4 fI60 P.2d 8021.)
[4b] In view of this ('Yioence. as to whi('h there is no conflict, the trial court was justified in findin/! that due proof of
the insured's disabilit~, was furnished on February 20th, although the claim form filled out in the presence of the inspector was not filed with defendant until the following day.
The policY does not provide that proof of disability be given
in writing. [6] It is settled that the term "due proof" of
disability, in the absence of a specifie requirement in the policy, "does not require any particular form of proof which the
insured might arbitrarily demand. but only a statement of
fact as, if established in eourt would require payment of the
claim:" (McAndrews v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 332.
335 r271 N.W. 857. 109 A.L.R. 8211 : Aetna Life Ins. Co: v.
Tipps. 132 Tex. 213 r121 RW.2r1 3241: Zorger v. Prudential
1118. Co., 282 TIl.App. 444: 1i'()rman v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
267 Mich. 426 r255 ~.W. 2221: Prunential Ins. Co. v. Litzke,
36 Del. 592 [179 A. 4921 : 'Wade v. Metropolitan Life In.~. Co.,.
179 S.C. 70 rI83 S.E. !)891 : see 10H A.L.R. 825: 3 Appleman
Insurance Law and Practice, § 1444; see, also, Kennedy v.
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 18 Ca1.2d 627. 631 f117 P.2d 31.)
[7] Due proof' is required to enable the insurer to form an
estimate of itR rights and liabilities (O'Ret1ly v. G'Uardian
J-futual Life Ins. Co .. 60 N.Y. 169 fI9 Am.Rep. 1511: American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Yee Lim Shee, 104 F.2d 688. cert. den.
308 U.S. 592 [60 S.Ct. 122. 84 L.Ed. 4951: Ha.ba v. Mutual
Ben. Health & Ace. AsS1I .. 2ROMirh. 531 r273 ~.W. 7951.)
What the reasonable requirements for that purpose are will
depend upon the eircustances of the particular case. (See
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Pr1f(lrnlial Ins. Co. v. IA.tzkc, SU1)1"I1.' [4c] In the present
case the insured's representative advised defendant of the
insllre(J's disability and of his intention to base thereon his
C'Jaim that the poliC'y had not lapsed and that he was entitled
to disahility bendits He fi1so fl(h-ised defendant that the
matter was urgent. nefend:mt oi(l not explnin at the trial
why it din not keep the promisr mfldr to t11r insurc(rs represent.ative that thr forms wonl(l hr aVflilahlr to tllP insured on
February 17tll Drfcnonnt .. howev!'r. s!'nt its insprctor on
t.he afternoon of the 20th. tllr 1n8t da~' of thr six-month perioo. thns /rivinl! the insnren :m eleventh hour chance to comply with thr relluirrmrnts of the polic~' find to provide defendant with the nc('eSSfiTV informfition. It is ('lear from the
evidence that the mertinl! 'thfit took place under these circumstances was for th(' purpose of mfiking proof of disfihility.
Defendant contends. however. thfit sincr it was contemplated
that a formal claim <;honli1 he filro with the immran('e com·
pany. the informfition Q'iven Ilt the meetinl! on Fehruary
20th was re,!!ardeil hy the partie!'l as merely preliminary to
the presentation of written proof. The record discloses that
the parties rel!arded t.hp meet.inl! "as a matter of making
a proof of dis a bilit~·." The fact that they also contemplated
the filing of thp proof in written form does not render ineffective the proof previonsly given.
[8] Although the roli('~' contains no express requirement
that proof be given in writing'. defendant contends that such
a requirement shou1<'l he implied from section 1 (3) of the
poliey which proviile~: "3. Rencfits.-Upon receipt at the
Company's Home Offi('e. before default in payment of premium, of due proof that the Insured is totally and presumably permanently disfihled .
thE' following benefits will be
~ranted: (a) Tncomp Payments . . . (b) Waiver of premiums. . .. " This provision is not concerned with how proof
is to be given. but with when benefits are to begin. The policy
does not rE'C]uire thllt proof of disability be received at the
home office of the compan~' before it can be restored. Section 1 (4) of the policy provides that it will be restored "provided dne proof that the Insured is totally and presumably
permanently disabled. as herein defined. 1S received by the
Compan~' not later than Rix months after said default." This
provision requires merel~' that dne proof be "received by
the ('.omPfiny." not that it be received at its home office. In
a'J

)

C~

19·f

CULLEY 1.'. :\'EW Y()Hh LIFE lXR. CO.

fart it is not ronlf'lIflp,l Il::!1 ,kff'wl:lllt \ Lm..\ ll'!f'les ilfii,'c
had 110 nuthority to recci\'c lll'()of of ,1isnllilil.\·. The sPf'cifl .
. . enlion of r('r('ipt nt the h011](' IIrfi('(' in lh(' ]lI'O\'isioll rclnling to
illrolll(, pnYl11(,Jlls nn(l wnin'l" of pl'(,llliuTrls nIH1 thc omission
of sl1rll H requirement in t}](' p"o\"ision rdalill~! to ,'('slol'ation
plninl~' inilicates thnt Sllrh n I'P'Inir(,lll('nt wns 110t int('T\(ll'fl in
the cnsc of restoration. [9] Tn an~' ('vent llny (1 011 lit ;IS to
the mellnin~ of thl' poliry 1I111"t hr· 1'1'<;01\'(><1 in fn\'ol' of the
insllreil I1nd(>r w('l1 known r1l1c'f'; of intrl'nT·(>lntion. (Blackburn v. flome "1'((> lf1.~. r!o .. 19 f'nL2rl 22G [120 P.2d 311;
Baine v. <7onfill(,11frr1 .1sslIr. nn .. ~1 rn1.2(1 1 [12!l P.2(1 3%,
142 A.L.R. 12;JB1.)
[10] Defrnilant contenr1s thnt plnilltiff flid not prove that
til(' insured wns totllll~' (lisn hlec1 on A1H!11st 20. 1 !l40, since the
writtrn claim shows on its fnl'e tll:lt total ilisnbili1~' ilid not·
begin until nine ilavs aft(>1' thr poli('~' had lnpsrfl. The written form eontninN1 t he follO\\'ill~ qnestion allfl answer: "From
what date has ~'onr disnhi1it~· pre\'ented ~'0\1 from engag'ing
in any occupation .whllt,oe\'pr for remun(>rntion or profitT
August 29. 1940." This question ('alled for a le~al ('onclm;ion
as to the meanin~ of total ilislI hilitv ani! the date of its commencement (see Err('.Ca v. Wesfer~ Strrf(>s 'Jife Ins. Co .. 19
Ca1.2d 388, 394 f121 P2d 689. 141 A,L.R. 681), Rnd the answer given was subject to explanation and correction. Aug'Ust 29. 1940. was the datE' when Dr. Wilke, under whose care
the insured remained nntil his death. fir~t rer('ivE'd an (>mergenry call to see the insured. who was suffering from an extreme pain in his chest. The insured had bpen under other
medical care before that time and his health had failed long
before that particular ni~ht of suffpring. The written form
also referred to the insureil's failing health before August
29, 1940. for the qu(>stion as to when the illness leading to the
insured's disability began was answerro: "Pain began in
March, 1940. Doctors state t.hat cancer must have begun
over 2 years ago. Spellt part of time in bed since latter part
of .June. 1940." Defendant did not rely upon plaintiff's
written statements but chose instead to make its own inve!'ltigation and concluded that total oisahility'ilid not begin until
December 19. 1940. the date when the insured went to his
office for the last t.ime. Defendant was familiar with RUbstantially the same facts as the trial court. That it appraised
them differently is immaterial.
In the absence of estoppel, statements in proofs of loss are
Dot conclusive. .. A statement in. a proof • • . that is not
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-------true UOC~ 1I0t cstop the bCIH'fieiul'Y ax a IllUllCI' or 111\\ where
the illsurer is not pr<'jlldi('t'cl thrrchy. It is 1lH'l'eiy c\'id('llr(~
to Iwcollsi<lt'red and gj',ell such w(·i[!:ht as the jl1l'Y think it
elltitkd to in cOllllrrtion with all othcr c\'idcllct, in thr ease."
(()CUlll Accident &- (;wlI'fllllcc' CorI'o V • •1/'101'('. S;) 1.'.2<1 ;JlifJ,
::7:.!. (wt. dell. 2!)!) U.8. G09 157 S.Ct. ~:l;;. S1 L. E(1. Hfl J ; Pirsl
Sal. Hank v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27 C.2d 64. i'illl)/'cmc Tent
1(.O.T ..lI: v. Stensland, 20G Ill. ]24 I GS·:-\.E. 1()!18, fl9 Am.St.
Hep. 137] ; IJarrill{/ton Y. Southc'/"n Surety Co., ~06 lowa 92:>
[2~1 N.W. 57~); Gass v. CmnmOntl'Nllth Casualty Co., 113
Kan. 510 1214 P. 11]5J ; Pnldentiallns. Co. v. Kendrick, 2H2
K~·. 297 [flO S.W.2d 52): Spencer v. Citizens' M. L. Ins. Assn.,
]42 N.Y. GOG 137 N.B. 617) ; Wade v . .l1ctr01Joliian Life Ins.
Co., supra; Clm'ke v. T1'Gvelcrs' Ins. Co., 94 Vt. 383 [111 A.
4-l-fl]; Armstrong v.Modern Woodmen of America, 93 "Tash.
3;)2 [160 P. 946, Ann.Cas. 1918E 263] ; see Appleman, op; cit.,
§§ 1471-1474 and 7 Courh, Cyeloprdia of Insurance JJaw,
_§ 1[;56.)
l\' achtel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., ~66 N.Y. 345 [194
N.E. 850], on which defendant relies, is clearly distinguishable. In that case the policy provided for double indemnity
upon due proof that "death . • . resulted from bodily injuries caused... exclusively . . . by accidental means."
The proof submitted to the insurance company stated that
the insurcd had died of coronary ~hrombosis. In faet death
rcsulted from an accidental injury. ReeoY(;'r~' of the double
.indemnity was denied on thc ground that "a party required
by contract to submit proof of certain facts as a .!ondition
of liahility, does not perform the condition by submitting
throug-h error proof that these facts do not exist." (266
X.Y. 345, 351.) III the Wachtel ease the plaintiff failed to
furnish all~' proof of accidental death, the risk insured against.
III the present case ample proof of total disability was gh'en
tog-ether with an answer to a question that was at most an
admission. The opinion in the Wachtel case declares, in conformity with thc overwhelming weight. of authority that" Admissions, in proofs of claims to insurance companies, like
other admissions, are subject to explanation. They are not
conclusive, and proof may be presented that they are erroneous." (266 N.Y. 345,351.)
[11] This action is l10t barred, as defendant contends,
on the (Zl'ound th(1t the inf:l11'('d failed to pay the arrears
in prcmium with interest or that the complaint was filed

III C.2d
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after his deatb. 'l'he rcstoration cIa liS!' requires <ll'I'Cal'S in
premium to be paid with 5 per c('nt illt crest hill do('s not
specify any period within which surll paylJlL'lIt must be
made, "'hell theiJIsllJ'L'(] filed his (·laim 1'01' <lisahilit,\' :"'lIcfi1.s
with dl'friJdarit, he did not tender the ~O\'('lllh('l' ~Olh premium but tendered a cheel, for the Allgust 20th pl'emium
and interest, whirh defendant refused to accept. Sinr(' de,
fendant was not entitled to the arrears of premium unless
the policy was restored. it was reasonahle for the insllred
to wait until his <'Iaim was pas~ed upon hcforr tendering
any payment. On March 10, 1!l41, defendant made its position known. It denied liability. not on the ground that no
payment had yet heen made, but on the ground that total
disability had not begun until after default. Such unconditional denial of liahility gave rise immediately to a cause
of action and rendered an~' tender of premiums unnecessary. (Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246 [23 P. 869,
17 Am.St.Rep. 233] ; ]fc('onough v. Home Ins. Co., 155 Cal.
659 [102 P. 8J4, 1R Ann.Cas. 8621; Wilkinson v. Standard
Ace. Ins. 00., 180 Cal. 252 [180 P. 6071 j metlin v. General
American Life Ins. Co.; 4 Ca1.2rl 336 r49 P.2d 5901: Grant
v. Sun Indemnity Co., 11 Ca1.2d 438 [80 P.2d 9961 : Paez
v. Mut'UOl Indent. ctc. Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App. 654 [3 P.2d
69].)
[12] Since the cause of action arose while the
insured was alive, it is immaterial that the complaint was
filed after his death. Anderson v. New York Life 111.mmnce
Co., 64 Ca1.App.2d 798 [149 P.2d 4G2], and Johnson v.
Mutual Life Tnsurance Co .. 70 F.2d 41, are distinguishable
on the ground that in those cases the insnreo iliff not 1'nrnish
proof of disabilit~· before his death,
[13] The trial court erroneously awal'dcd disability
benefits for a period of nine months preceding the death
of the insured. Disability payments under the policy were
to begin onl~' upon receipt of proof of disability at the com-'
pany's home office. Such proof was not received there until
March 3, 194]. If, however, the trial court was correct in
finding that the defendant denied liability on February 18,
1941, the obligation to pay disability benefits began that day,
for the denial of liability amounted to a waiver of the
requirements that proof be submitted. The letter, dated
Februa~' 13, 194], in which defendant notified the insured
that the policy had no further insurance value was received
on February 18, 1941. That letter, however, was written
,ill answer to an inquiry from the insured without a.D.T.
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knowledge on defendant's part that the insured was dis·
abled. When it was written, the policy had no further insurance value unless the iDBured had been totally disabled
as far back as August 20, 1940. Disability wu not mentioned in September, 1940, when the insured gave defendant
his note for the August premium. Nor was it mentioned
in October, 1940, when the insured gave defendant his check
in payment of that note or in the same month when he paid
a premium on another policy, although he could have
avoided that payment by filing proof of disability. Finally,
disability was not mentioned even in the inquiry as to the
status of the policy, which defendant answered in its letter
of February 13, 1941. While the insured was under no duty
to furnish proof of total disability before February 20, 1941,
defendant was under no duty to suggest to hUn that his
policy might be restored under conditions that it had no
reason to believe existed.
The judgment is modified to provide for deduction 01. an
amount equal to the premiums due August 20th and November 20th, 1940, with interest at 5 per cent to date of judgment
and for recovery of disability benefits from March 3d, 1941.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed; plainWf to recover her costs on appeal.
Gibson, C.•1., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., Nourse,
J., pro tern., and Peters, J. t pro tern., concurred.

